By reflecting upon Korea's state-led development, its socio-economic consequences, and its current reform efforts and trends, this article calls for reconstructing the state and redefining the identity of its political economy towards people-centered development. Crafting a democratic and empowering dirigisme and institutionalizing democratic values such as public trust and rule of law constitute the nation's pressing task in its quest for a good society. However, dirigiste choice of growth over equity at an early stage of development process may not be easily reversible at a later stage. Dirigiste development and undemocratic governance create entrenched, self-sustaining interests and structures that no amount of reform politics as usual can touch.
However, Korea's political power holders wielded tight control over the highly-politicized state bureaucracies, and the Korean state and its bureaucracy's embeddedness remained essentially exclusionary in favor of the big business conglomerates, known as chaebol 5 and not nearly inclusive of the general 3 society or small business operators. 6 The consequent elite collusion, which had apparently laid golden eggs, became increasingly entangling over time, deeply underlying the pathologies of Korea's top-down, centralized and undemocratic statism.
The negative effects of such a diseased dirigisme or undemocratic, collusive system of state-led development -with a highly chaebol-oriented economy and a very weak small business sector 7 -included the Korean political economy's inflexibility, instability, weak social cohesion and disempowered people. 7 Unless otherwise noted, the terms small businesses or small and medium enterprises (SMEs) used interchangeably in this article denote manufacturing enterprises with no more than 300 employees in Korea, albeit with some exceptions allowed since 1992 for labor-intensive industries. While the official definitions of small business of other countries even in the same Northeast Asian region are not exactly the same as Korea's, most of their statistical publications on SMEs are actually based on the number of a firm's regular employees, which make international comparison possible. 8 See Hun Joo Park, "After Dirigisme: Globalization, Democratization, the Still Faulted State and Its Social Discontent in Korea," The Pacific Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, (2002) . 4 and open participation in the political, economic and social realms. From the standpoint of the poor and the ordinary citizens, the problem is not just that of housing shortage or excessive housing cost, but also that of poor housing quality. As of 2000, for instance, 23 percent of the nation's housing stock was rated as below the minimum requirement for appropriate housing; eight percent (or 1.1 million households) of all households lived in a cramped one-room living arrangement.
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From Entangling Embeddedness to People-centered Development
Reconstructing the state and thereby crafting a democratic dirigisme constitutes Korea's pressing task in its quest for a good society that respects the human dignity of ordinary citizens. Democratic dirigisme requires institutionalizing a transparent and accountable public policymaking process. Such reconstruction of the state does not in any way eliminate national sovereignty; it may just transform the means and purposes of the nation-state without weakening or withering its capacity. The reconstructed state can and does play a positive role in transforming state-society relations, providing social safety nets, empowering financial institutions, inventing a vibrant civil society and actively building democratic institutions to allow for orderly bottom-up changes. The key lies in how to forge what mixture of state and market. Especially in the Northeast Asian statist context, where the public continues to look to the state to redress their grievances, democratic dirigisme can be as robust an alternative as the neoclassical economics paradigm for people-centered development. In an effort to help recast the goals and means of the Korean state, the following section briefly looks at the way it has tried to restructure the country's financial sector since the 1997 financial crisis.
Top-down statist regimes notoriously lack the capacity to flexibly and incrementally adapt their goals and priorities to the changing external environment. The number of irregular, temporary workers has also increased from 43 percent of the total number of waged workers in 1996 to 48 percent by 2005. 32 And accordingly, Korea's income distribution has deteriorated during the same period. The country's Gini coefficient, 30 However, a democratic dirigiste state truly committed to a people-centered development would go a step further to empower its own people for fuller realization of their human potentials. As David Korten puts it, "
[o]ne of the important challenges of people-centered development is to reorient the major development bureaucracies of government to become organizations that appreciate and enhance the humanity of both their members and the citizens they are intended to serve."
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As the purpose of peoplecentered development and of constructing a more humane society is to enhance the well-being, economic equity, human dignity, liberty and community of the people, indispensable would be empowering people especially at lower levels both in and outside of government bureaucracies. Thus, it entails a restoration of public trust in the integrity of the state and its power holders, and a radical decentralization and delegation of power of the state and its policymaking and implementation processes, in 42 David Korten and Rudi Klauss, eds., People-centered Development, (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1984), ch. 30, p. 305. 20 which ordinary citizens genuinely and routinely participate in the workings of decisionmaking at various levels.
Especially in a country like Korea where power remains highly centralized and personalized, the delegation of decision-making authority from top to lower levels is a must to empower people. 
Concluding Remarks
The financial and economic collapse of 1997, a juncture as pivotal as that of Park Chung Hee's seizure of power in 1961, provoked serious reflection on Korea's development experience. Most Korean experts and the mainstream press saw -and still see -the nation's historical task to be to streamline the economy for more efficiency, growth, and global competitiveness. However, this misses the real lesson in the nation's purgatory: at the heart of Korea's development experience was a failure to put the people at the center of the process. While a kind of social equality was a subsidiary goal of Korea's elites throughout the development process, it was always a secondary one, a way of justifying top-down rule, whitewashing "grand" elite collusion and gaining popular acquiescence. Including and empowering ordinary citizens in policymaking and its implementation process was never seriously considered.
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This is not to downplay the importance of growth, efficiency and competitiveness. 44 The process of democratization since 1987, and the Kim Dae Jung government's "NGO empowerment" policy in particular, have started to engender multiplication of diverse interest groups and civil society organizations with crosscutting and contradictory interests. However, dirigiste choice of growth over equity at an early stage of development process may not be easily reversible at a later stage. Dirigiste development and undemocratic governance create entrenched, self-sustaining interests and structures that no amount of reform politics as usual can touch.
